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Abstract This paper discusses a particular type of optative constructions (which 
are constructions that express a wish without containing an overt lexical item that 
means wish): If-clauses in which optativity is apparently licensed by at least. I 
propose that the connection between at least and optativity is indirect and can be 
explained as follows. On the one hand, if-clauses generally have an optative 
reading; on the other hand, optative at least is an instance of concessive at least, 
which conveys desirability and thus supports (‘cues’) an optative reading. I 
propose that, as a consequence, the licensing of optativity by at least is a 
semantic conspiracy: I argue that there is a pragmatic preference for using 
optativity cues, which blocks optative readings in cue-less utterances. 
 
 
Keywords: optative, concessive, at least 
 
 
1 The core questions 
Optatives are constructions that express a wish, regret, hope or desire without 
containing an overt lexical item that means wish, regret, hope or desire (e.g. 
Quirk et al. 1985, Scholz 1991, Rosengren 1993, Rifkin 2000, Kyriakaki 2007, 
2008, 2009, Asarina & Shklovsky 2008, Biezma 2011ab, Grosz 2011ab). An 
example is given in (1a), which conveys the wish paraphrased in (1b). It is crucial 
that native speakers judge (1a) to be a complete utterance, as opposed to an 
incomplete conditional clause, cf. Rifkin 2000. In other words, we cannot classify 
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an utterance as an optative if native speakers judge it as an incomplete, 
fragmentary utterance that cannot stand on its own. 
 
(1) a. If only the sandwiches had been edible! 
 b. I wish the sandwiches had been edible. 
 
Optatives typically contain particles that appear to be obligatory and thus may be 
classified pre-theoretically as licensors of optativity. In English, only, just and but 
occur in optatives, as shown in (2). Their apparent obligatoriness is shown in (3). 
None of the utterances in (3) can be used to express a wish, and  they appear to be 
incomplete conditionals in a sense in which the optatives in (2) are not. 
 
(2) a. If I’d only listened to my parents! 
 b. If I could just make them understand my point of view! 
 c. If I could but explain! 
  (Quirk et al. 1985: 842) 
 
(3) a.   # If I’d listened to my parents! 
 b.   # If I could make them understand my point of view! 
 c.   # If I could explain! 
 
The larger research question that this paper addresses can be stated as follows: 
How do we account for this apparent obligatoriness of particles in optatives? In 
addressing this question, we face an apparent compositionality problem. Can we 
derive the core meaning of an optative like (1a) compositionally from the standard 
meaning of an if-clause and the standard meaning of the particle only? 
The answer that I propose radically differs from previous approaches to 
optativity.1 I reject the idea that optativity arises compositionally from the 
standard meaning of if-clauses and the standard meaning of particles. In contrast, I 
argue that optativity is inherently independent from the presence of such particles. 
To account for the quasi-obligatoriness of such particles, I argue that the 
semantics of the particles conspires with the semantics of an optative utterance, 
giving rise to the connection that we observe. 
In this paper, I focus on a sub-question of the above, and discuss a variant of 
optatives that is cross-linguistically well-represented (cf. Scholz 1991 for 
German, Biezma 2011b for Spanish), but does not seem to exist in English: 
optatives that are apparently licensed by at least. The relevant construction is 
schematically illustrated in (4), where the superscripted hash marks in parentheses 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
1 For English if only optatives, previous approaches include Rifkin (2000), Asarina & Shklovsky 
(2008), and Biezma (2011ab). 
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mark the fact that (4a-b) are typically not accepted as complete utterances by 
native speakers of English.2 A well-formed German example is given in (5). 
 
(4) a.  (#) If at least the sandwiches had been edible! 
 b.  (#) If I could at least make them understand my point of view! 
 
(5) Wenn ich mich wenigstens hinsetzen könnt’! 
 if   I  me  at.least    sit.down  could 
 ‘If I could at least sit down!’ 
 (adapted and shortened from Scholz 1991: 102) 
 
Within the larger research question introduced above, this paper analyzes the role 
of at least in such optatives: What does it contribute to such constructions and 
how does it function as a licensor? 
2 The proposal 
On a general note, I argue that particles in optatives involve weaker readings than 
their standard counterparts, specifically they only convey meaning at the level of 
non-truth-conditional meaning. As shown in Grosz 2011b, this can be argued for 
only-type particles, at least-type particles and the particle doch/toch that we find 
in German and Dutch. In the present paper, I focus on AT LEAST3 in optatives, the 
truth-conditional vacuity of which can be schematized as in (6). (I model its non-
truth-conditional component as a definedness condition. It is beyond the scope of 
this paper to address whether it is most appropriately analyzed as presuppositional 
meaning or in terms of conventional implicature.) 
 
(6) If defined, ||AT LEAST(φ)|| = ||φ||. 
 
I argue that optative AT LEAST (i.e. the AT LEAST that licenses optatives) is a 
variant of Nakanishi & Rullmann’s (2009) concessive AT LEAST, a natural 
example of which is given in (7). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
2 Biezma (2011b) argues that such at least optatives do exist in English, corroborated by some 
naturally occurring examples in her footnote 22. Correspondingly, Biezma leads us to expect that 
(4a-b) are well-formed, something that is also consistent with my proposal. However, native 
speakers of English that I consulted reject Biezma’s examples and my (4a-b). It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to determine why English should differ from other languages in this regard. 
3 I use small caps to mark an element in the object-language, or a specific reading of such an 
element, that has counterparts in various languages. In this sense, “(concessive) AT LEAST” is an 
abbreviation for “(concessive) at least in English and its equivalents in other languages (such as 
German wenigstens)”. Correspondingly, italicized at least always means “AT LEAST in English”. 
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(7) Well, at least you won something! 
 
My own rendering of Nakanishi & Rullmann’s analysis is given in (8), with the 
auxiliary definitions in (9).4 
 
(8) a.   ||AT LEAST (concessive)||g,c = λS.λC.λp : 
 b.      S is a bouletic ordering ∧           BOULETIC  
 c.      ∃r ∈ g(C) [r >S p] ∧              NOT THE BEST 
 d.      ∃q ∈ g(C) [p >S q] .              NOT THE WORST 
 e.      p                        IDENTITY 
 
(9) a. A scale S is defined as a set of ordered pairs of propositions      
  (S ⊆ ℘(W) × ℘(W)). 
 b. For any S, I use p1 >S p2 to mean ‘p1 is strictly higher than p2 on S’. 
 c. For any S, I use p1 ≥S p2 to mean ‘p1 is equivalent to p2 or higher than  
  p2 on S’ 
 
Stating (8) in words, concessive AT LEAST has the following properties: It is a 
truth-conditionally vacuous element, (8e), and combines with a scale S and a 
proposition p, as well as a contextually salient set of propositions C. At the level 
of non-truth-conditional meaning it restricts the scale S to a bouletic scale, (8b), 
and presupposes that there is a contextually salient proposition that is more 
preferable than the modified proposition p, (8c), as well as a contextually salient 
proposition that is less preferable, (8d). This gives rise to the ‘settling for less’ 
effect that Nakanishi & Rullmann (2009) document: concessive AT LEAST 
conveys that the modified proposition does not describe the optimal, most 
desirable situation, but that it does not describe the worst, least desirable situation 
either. For the example in (7), the above analysis can be illustrated as in (10). As 
shown in (10a-b), the proposition you (i.e. the hearer) won something is contained 
in a set of salient alternatives C, with respect to which it is ranked on a salient 
scale S. If defined, the particle at least is truth-conditionally vacuous in (7), 
shown in (10c). Finally, at least is defined iff all of the following three conditions 
are met. First, (10d-i), the salient scale S is a bouletic scale (i.e. propositions that 
are higher on S are more preferable than propositions that are lower). Second, 
(10d-ii), there is a higher (i.e. more preferable) contextual alternative r. Third, 
(10d-iii), there is a lower (i.e. less preferable) contextual alternative q. In the 
typical context in which (7) can be uttered, both is the case. The hearer could have 
won exactly the prize that she desired most, satisfying (10d-ii), but she could have 
also won nothing, satisfying (10d-iii). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
4 These auxiliary definitions are loosely based on work in Klinedinst 2005, Villalta 2007. 
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(10) a. C = {you won nothing, 
     you won something (but not the prize that you wanted to win), 
     you won the prize that you wanted to win, …} 
 b. S =  you won the prize that you wanted to win >S you won something  
     (but not the prize that you wanted to win) >S you won nothing 
 c. If defined, ||at leastS,C you won something|| = ||you won something||. 
 d. ||at leastS,C you won something|| is defined iff 
  i.  S is a bouletic ordering, 
  ii.  ∃r ∈ g(C) [r >S you-won-something] 
  iii.  ∃q ∈ g(C) [you-won-something >S q] 
 
One of the core contributions of the present paper is the proposal that cross-
linguistically, if AT LEAST serves to license optativity, we are always dealing with 
the truth-conditionally vacuous concessive AT LEAST, and never with the more 
canonical AT LEAST, which conveys that the modified proposition and possibly 
more is the case (Nakanishi & Rullmann’s epistemic AT LEAST). I present 
arguments for this proposal in section 3.  
3 Cross-linguistic evidence 
So far, I have presented my proposal that AT LEAST in optatives should be 
analyzed as Nakanishi & Rullmann’s (2009) concessive AT LEAST, as rendered in 
(8) above. This sets it apart from the more canonical reading of AT LEAST, 
rendered in (11),5 which Nakanishi & Rullmann (2009) call epistemic AT LEAST.6 
 
(11) a.   ||AT LEAST (epistemic)||g,c = λS.λC.λp.λw : 
 b.  ∃w’[Epist(w)(w’) ∧ ∃q ∈ C [q >S p ∧ q(w’) = 1]] . UNCERTAINTY 
 c.  ∃q ∈ C [q ≥S p ∧ q(w) = 1]              MINIMUM 
 
Epistemic AT LEAST, illustrated in (12), asserts that the modified proposition or 
some higher scalar alternative is true, and conveys at a non-truth-conditional level 
that it is possible (though not certain) that some higher scalar alternative is true. 
 
(12) In the accident, there were at least 5 casualties. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
5 Example (11) is my adaptation of Nakanishi & Rullmann’s entry, who, in turn, acknowledge 
Krifka 1999, Geurts & Nouwen 2007 and Büring 2008 as the basis of their analysis. I differ by 
treating the uncertainty contribution as a definedness condition, while they treat it as a 
conventional implicature. This is a distinction that I will not be concerned with in this paper.  
6 Note that epistemic AT LEAST also has an impact at the truth-conditional at issue level, cf. (11c), 
whereas concessive AT LEAST does not contribute anything on the truth-conditional level, cf. (8e). 
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I will now provide evidence that optative AT LEAST is concessive AT LEAST and 
not epistemic AT LEAST. To do so I start by reviewing a relevant diagnostic. 
In English, Nakanishi & Rullmann (2009) observe that concessive readings 
are preferred for sentence-initial at least, (13b), and excluded if at least is located 
between the verb and the direct object, (13a). 
 
(13) a.   Mary won at least a silver medal.  (only epistemic reading) 
 b. At least Mary won a silver medal.  (concessive reading preferred) 
  (Nakanishi & Rullmann 2009: slide 6) 
 
The distinction between concessive AT LEAST and epistemic AT LEAST entails 
various differences between the two types of AT LEAST (see Nakanishi & 
Rullmann 2009). The difference that is most crucial for my project can be stated 
as follows. In the case of epistemic AT LEAST, it is odd to negate all higher 
alternatives, as illustrated in (14) and (15). Due to the position of at least, (14a) 
and (15a) do not have a concessive AT LEAST reading, making them semantically 
ill-formed, as opposed to (14b) and (15b). 
 
(14) a.  # Mary didn’t win a gold medal, but she won at least a silver medal. 
 b. Mary didn’t win a gold medal, but at least she won a silver medal. 
  (Nakanishi & Rullmann 2009: slide 7) 
 
(15) a.  # Mary doesn’t have three children, but she has at least two. 
 b. Mary doesn’t have three children, but at least she has two. 
  (Nakanishi & Rullmann 2009: slide 7) 
 
The ability of AT LEAST to occur in clauses such as (14) and (15) can thus be taken 
to be a diagnostic for a concessive reading. I now provide three arguments that 
optative AT LEAST is concessive AT LEAST. 
The first argument is based on German. Let me first show that German has 
both a designated concessive AT LEAST, wenigstens, and a designated epistemic AT 
LEAST, mindestens. Example (16) shows that wenigstens ‘at least’, but not 
mindestens ‘at least’, has a concessive reading. Only the former passes the 
diagnostic that we introduced above. 
 
(16) Maria hat  kein Gold gewonnen, aber wenigstens / #mindestens Silber. 
 Maria has  no  gold won    but  at.least      at.least    silver 
 ‘Maria didn’t win gold, but at least she won silver.’ 
 
In turn, example (17) shows that wenigstens ‘at least’ does not have an epistemic 
reading, while mindestens ‘at least’ does (cf. Gast (2011), who also observes that 
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wenigstens is ill-formed in a statement like (17)). As Nakanishi & Rullmann 
(2009) observe, the use of concessive AT LEAST (but not epistemic AT LEAST) 
conveys that there is a salient more preferable alternative as well as a less 
preferable alternative. The intuition in (17) is that wenigstens ‘at least’ conveys 
that more casualties (six, seven, eight, …) would have been better than five, but 
five casualties is better than less casualties (four, three, two, …); this renders the 
utterance pragmatically odd.7 
 
(17) Bei  dem Unfall  gab es  mindestens /    # wenigstens fünf Tote. 
 at   the  accident gave it  at.least      at.least    five casualties 
 ‘There were at least five casualties in the accident.’ 
 
In short, we have established that mindestens only has an epistemic AT LEAST 
reading and wenigstens only has a concessive AT LEAST reading. It is easy to show 
that optatives require the latter. As shown in (18), only wenigstens ‘at least’ can 
be used to license an optative. 
 
(18) Wenn Hans  wenigstens / #mindestens auf  Maria gehört  hätte! 
 if   Hans  at.least     at.least    to  Maria listened had 
 ‘If only Hans had at least listened to Maria!’ 
 
Example (18) is thus a first argument that optative AT LEAST is concessive AT 
LEAST. The second argument consists of the observation that, as expected if 
optative AT LEAST is concessive AT LEAST, we find the following. In many 
languages that can use an at least-type item in optatives, the same item also has a 
concessive AT LEAST reading while lacking an epistemic AT LEAST reading. This 
includes Romanian măcar, Polish chociaż, Russian xotja and Finnish edes, the 
first two of which are illustrated in (19) and (20).8 
Example (19a) is an at-least optative in Romanian, licensed by the item măcar 
‘at least’; (19b) shows that măcar ‘at least’ cannot occur in prototypical contexts 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
7 A question that arises is naturally why (17) automatically generates the preference scale in (i) 
and not the inverted preference scale in (ii). If the preference scale in (ii) could be selected, (17) 
should be perfectly well-formed. It is beyond the scope of this paper to account for this 
observation. It is also worth pointing out that this observation holds for all instances of concessive 
AT LEAST, both in optative and non-optative constructions. 
  i. … > six casualties >preferable five casualties >preferable four casualties > … 
 ii. … > four casualties >preferable five casualties >preferable six casualties > … 
8 For translations and consultation, I thank: Mikko Kupula (Finnish); Grzegorz Michalski, Bożena 
Rozwadowska, Bartosz Wiland (Polish); Gianina Iordachioaia, Andreea Nicolae (Romanian); 
Aysa Arylova, Natasha Ivlieva, Alexander Podobryaev, Igor Yanovich (Russian). 
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in which epistemic AT LEAST is found, and (19c-d) show that măcar ‘at least’ 
passes our diagnostic for concessive AT LEAST.9 
 
 (19)  Romanian 
  a. Dacă Jon  măcar  ar fi  ascultat  de  Mary! 
  if    Jon  at.least  had  listened  of  Mary 
  ‘If only John had at least listened to Mary!’  
 b. Sunt  cel puţin /  *măcar  patru  mere  în punga asta. 
  are  at least   at.least  four  apples in bag  this 
  ‘There are at least four apples in this bag.’ 
 c. Maria  nu  a câştigat  medalia  de  aur, dar măcar a câştigat  medalia 
  Maria not won    medal  of gold but at.least won    medal 
  de  argint. 
  of silver 
  ‘Mary didn’t win a gold medal, but at least she won a silver medal.’ 
 d. Maria nu  are  trei  copii,   dar  măcar  are  doi. 
  Maria not  has  three children  but  at.least  has  two 
  ‘Mary doesn’t have three children, but at least she has two.’ 
 
Polish is parallel to Romanian. We find at-least optatives that employ chociaż ‘at 
least’, (20a), but again chociaż ‘at least’ cannot occur in epistemic AT LEAST 
contexts, (20b). As shown in (20c-d), chociaż ‘at least’ passes our diagnostic for 
concessive AT LEAST, mirroring the facts from Romanian. 
 
(20)  Polish 
 a.  Gdyby / Żeby  Jan  chociaż  (po)słuchał        Marii!  
  if    if    John  at.least listen.(perf.)pret.3sg.m Mary.gen.nom.f 
  ‘If at least Jan had listened to Mary!’ 
 b. W torbie są  co najmniej / # chociaż  cztery  jabłka. 
  in bag  are  at least     at.least   four   apples 
  ‘In this bag, there are at least four apples.’ 
 c. Marie nie zdobyła złotego medalu, ale chociaż zdobyła srebrny. 
  Mary not receive  gold   medal  but at.least  receive  silver 
  ‘Mary didn’t win a gold medal, but at least she won a silver medal.’ 
 d. Marie nie  ma  trojga dzieci,  ale  ma  chociaż dwoje. 
  Mary not  has  three  children but  has  at.least  two 
  ‘Mary doesn’t have three children, but at least she has two.’ 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
9 Romanian măcar ‘at least’ and Finnish edes ‘at least’ also have another reading as NPI EVEN. 
See Grosz (2011b) for discussion, Rullmann & Nakanishi (2009) for the even-at least connection. 
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The third argument for an analysis of optative AT LEAST as concessive AT LEAST 
stems from the following prediction. Some languages employ a variant of AT 
LEAST in optatives that can have an epistemic AT LEAST reading; my proposal 
predicts that any such variant of AT LEAST is ambiguous between a concessive AT 
LEAST reading and an epistemic AT LEAST reading (the former of which is what 
occurs in optatives). This prediction can be confirmed for all such elements that I 
have looked at, including Greek tulachiston, Hebrew le-faxot, Czech aspoň and 
Spanish al menos. The Greek and Hebrew cases are illustrated in (21) and (22).10 
Example (21a) shows that Greek tulachiston ‘at least’ can license an optative 
utterance. As shown in (21b), tulachiston has an epistemic AT LEAST reading, i.e. 
it is completely natural in a clause that states something undesirable such as there 
being five casualties. Nevertheless, (21c-d) show that tulachiston also has a 
concessive AT LEAST reading; it passes the test from Nakanishi & Rullmann 2009 
that I have introduced and applied above. 
 
(21) Greek 
 a. An tulachiston o  Yannis  iche   akusi   tin Maria!  
  if  at.least    the Yannis  had.3sg listened the Maria.acc 
  lit. ‘If Yannis had at least listened to Maria!’ 
 b.  Sto  aftokinitistiko atixima, skotothikan tulachiston pende anthropi.  
  in-the car      accident were.killed at.least   five  people 
  ‘There were at least 5 casualties in the traffic accident.’ 
 c. I   Maria dhen kerdhise chriso metalio, ala tulachiston kerdhise  
  the Maria not  won   gold  medal  but at.least    won 
  arjiro/asimenjo (metalio) 
  silver      medal 
   ‘Mary didn’t win a gold medal, but at least she won a silver medal.’ 
 d. I   Maria dhen  echi tria  pedhja,  ala  tulachiston echi dhio. 
  the Maria not   has  three children but  at.least    has  two 
  ‘Mary doesn't have three children, but at least she has two.’ 
 
Hebrew mirrors the Greek facts. As shown in (21a), le-faxot ‘at least’ can be used 
to license an optative utterance. This particle also has an epistemic AT LEAST 
reading, shown in (21b). Once again, it also passes the test for a concessive AT 
LEAST reading, as shown in (21c-d). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
10 For translations and consultation, I thank: Ivona Kučerová, Radek Šimík (Czech); Lila 
Daskalaki, Marios Mavrogiorgos, Dimitris Michelioudakis (Greek); Micha Breakstone, Hadas 
Kotek (Hebrew); Luis Alonso-Ovalle, Paula Menendez-Benito (Spanish). 
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(22) Hebrew 
 a. lu   John haya     le-faxot makSiv    le-Mary!   
  if.cf  John be.past.3sg to-less  listen.pres.3sg to-Mary 
  lit. ‘If John/he had at least listened to Mary!’ 
 b. be-te’unat  ha-drax-im hayu     le-faxot xamiSa harug-im   
  in-accident the-way-pl  exist.masc-pl at-least  five   casualties 
  ‘There were at least 5 casualties in the traffic accident.’ 
 c. Mary lo   zaxta be-medalyat  zahav, aval le-faxot hi  zaxta   
  Mary not  won  in-medal    gold  but  at-least  she  won   
  be-medalyat  kesef. 
  in-medal    silver 
  ‘Mary didn’t win a gold medal, but at least she won a silver medal.’ 
 d. le-Mary eyn   SloSa yeladim, aval le-faxot yes  l-a   Snayim. 
  to-Mary not.exist three  children but  at-least  exist  to-her two 
  ‘Mary doesn't have three children, but at least she has two.’ 
 
Such languages thus verify the following prediction, as stated above. If we find an 
apparently canonical (i.e. epistemic) variant of AT LEAST in an optative, this 
lexical item must be ambiguous between an epistemic reading and a concessive 
reading. This follows if optative AT LEAST is always concessive AT LEAST. 
4 The effect of placing concessive at least into an optative 
In the preceding sections, I have argued that optative AT LEAST is an occurrence of 
concessive AT LEAST. I would now like to briefly illustrate the main effect of 
placing concessive AT LEAST into an optative. Let us look at a sample optative, 
where we can see that wenigstens ‘at least’ has the semantics of concessive AT 
LEAST, as introduced in (8). Consider the scenario in (23a), which gives rise to the 
preference scale in (23b) (loosely adapted from Villalta 2007). 
 
(23) a.   Context: Sofia promised to bring dessert to my picnic, but I forgot to  
  tell her my preferences. My favorite dessert is chocolate cake; apple  
  pie is acceptable but less preferable; I hate vanilla ice cream. As a    
  matter of fact, Sofia ended up bringing vanilla ice cream. 
 b. most preferable  chocolate cake > apple pie > vanilla ice cream  least preferable 
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In such a scenario, the following judgments hold. I can utter an optative to express 
a wish for a chocolate cake (the best possible scenario), as in (24b), as well as to 
express a wish for an apple pie (the ‘settling for less’ scenario), as in (25b).11  
 
(24) a.   Jetzt  kommt  die  mit  Vanilleeis     daher!  … 
  now  comes  she  with vanilla.ice.cream here 
  ‘Now she arrives with vanilla ice cream!’ 
 b. Wenn sie doch/#wenigstens einen Schokokuchen gebracht  hätte! 
  if   she doch #at.least    a    chocolate.cake  brought had 
  ‘If [doch/#at least] she had brought a chocolate cake!’ 
 
(25) a.   Jetzt  kommt  die  mit  Vanilleeis     daher!  … 
  now  comes  she  with vanilla.ice.cream here 
  ‘Now she arrives with vanilla ice cream!’ 
 b. Wenn sie wenigstens/??doch einen Apfelkuchen gebracht  hätte! 
  if   she at.least/??doch     a    apple.cake   brought had 
  ‘If [at least/??doch] she had brought an apple pie!’ 
 
Crucially, wenigstens ‘at least’ is only possible in (25b), where the modified 
proposition (she brought an apple pie) is not the best possible case, i.e. where 
there is a better alternative (namely: she brought a chocolate cake). In contrast, 
wenigstens ‘at least’ is impossible in (24b), where the modified proposition (she 
brought a chocolate cake) is the best possible case. As illustrated in (27), this 
follows directly from the semantics in (8), repeated in (26), due to the meaning 
component in (26c):12 There must be a better alternative in order for wenigstens 
‘at least’ to be licensed, cf. (27d-ii); this is satisfied in (25b), but not in (24b). 
 
(26) a.   ||AT LEAST (concessive)||g,c = λS.λC.λp : 
 b.      S is a bouletic ordering ∧           BOULETIC  
 c.      ∃r ∈ g(C) [r >S p] ∧              NOT THE BEST 
 d.      ∃q ∈ g(C) [p >S q] .              NOT THE WORST 
 e.      p                        IDENTITY 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
11 To construct a minimal pair, I contrast wenigstens ‘at least’ with doch; doch on its own seems to 
imply optimality, making it marked in a wish for the non-optimal apple pie, (25b). This is however 
not a strong constraint on doch and I will not be discussing this further (cf. Grosz 2011b). 
12 The meaning components in (8b)/(26b) (the modified proposition is ordered with respect to 
alternative propositions in terms of their desirability) and (8d)/(26d) (there is a contextually salient 
alternative that is less preferable than the modified proposition) are trivially present in any 
optative, even in the absence of AT LEAST, so we cannot learn anything from looking at them. 
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(27) a. C = {Sofia brought apple pie,  
     Sofia brought chocolate cake, 
     Sofia brought vanilla ice cream} 
 b. S =  Sofia brought chocolate cake >S Sofia brought apple pie >S Sofia 
     brought vanilla ice cream 
 c. If defined, 
  ||at leastS,C she brought an apple pie|| = ||she brought an apple pie||. 
 d. ||at leastS,C she brought an apple pie|| is defined iff 
  i.  S is a bouletic ordering, 
  ii.  ∃r ∈ g(C) [r >S apple-pie] 
  iii.  ∃q ∈ g(C) [apple-pie >S q] 
 
The requirement for a salient alternative that is more preferable than the modified 
proposition accounts for one intuition that native speakers share: if-at-least 
optatives are often less natural than corresponding if-only-optatives and cannot 
occur in an out-of-the-blue context, as illustrated in (28). This follows directly 
from the requirement in (26c) that there be a salient, more preferable alternative. 
 
(28) Wenn ich  doch / nur / #wenigstens  reich  wäre! 
 if   I   doch  only   at.least    rich  were 
 ‘If only I were rich!’ 
 
If we introduce such a salient, more preferable alternative overtly, as shown in 
(29), wenigstens ‘at least’ becomes natural in an utterance identical to (28). 
 
(29) a. Ach, wenn ich  doch  nur allmächtig  und  berühmt  wäre! 
  oh   if   I   doch  only omnipotent and  famous   were 
  ‘If only I were omnipotent and famous!’ 
 b. Oder wenn  ich  wenigstens reich  wäre! 
  or   if    I   at.least    rich  were 
  ‘Or at least if only I were rich!’ 
 
A more natural example is given in (30). 
 
(30)  a. Ach, wenn  sie   doch  einen  Schokokuchen gebracht hätte! 
  oh   if    she doch  an   chocolate.cake brought had 
  ‘If only she had brought an chocolate cake!’ 
 b. Oder wenn  sie  wenigstens einen Apfelkuchen gebracht hätte! 
  or   if    she at.least    an   apple.cake  brought had 
  ‘Or if at least she had brought an apple cake!’ 
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Notably, the more preferable alternative need not be overtly introduced; it can 
simply be implied, as in (31). Here, various more preferable alternatives can be 
construed, such as I never came to this concert, or the concert is already over, or 
the concert is taking place in a church. No matter how the reader/hearer resolves 
the search for a relevant alternative, wenigstens ‘at least’ will be licensed, due to 
the availability of a salient, more preferable alternative. 
 
(31) Erst viertel auf zehn? ... Mir kommt vor, ich sitz’ schon drei Stunden in dem 
 Konzert. Ich bin’s halt nicht gewohnt ... Was ist es denn eigentlich? Ich 
 muß das Programm anschauen ... Ja, richtig: Oratorium! Ich hab’ gemeint: 
 Messe. Solche Sachen gehören doch nur in die Kirche! Die Kirche hat auch 
 das Gute, daß man jeden Augenblick fortgehen kann. – Wenn ich 
 wenigstens einen Ecksitz hätt’! 
  ‘Only quarter past nine? … I feel like I’ve been sitting in this concert for  
 three hours. Well, I’m not used to it … What is it anyway? I’ll have to look 
 at the program … Yes, of course: An oratorio! I meant: A mass. Such things 
 belong into a church! A church also has the advantage that one can leave at 
 any time. – If at least I had a corner seat!’ 
 (A. Schnitzler. 1900. Leutnant Gustl.)13 
 
At this point we have not yet said anything about how to derive optativity as such. 
The next section is dedicated to this question. 
5 The Meaning of Optatives and the Generalized EX Operator 
To derive the wish that optatives convey, I propose that optative utterances are a 
variant of exclamative utterances, the meaning of which is due to a null operator 
EX (see Grosz 2011b for argumentation in favor of EX). EX selects a contextually 
salient scale and conveys that the modified proposition exceeds a salient threshold 
ξ on that scale. In optatives, the relevant scale reflects the speaker’s preferences, 
cf. (32); typically the threshold ξ marks the boundary between tolerable 
circumstances (including, in (32), circumstances in which Sofia brought apple 
pie) and intolerable circumstances (circumstances that in the utterance context of 
(32) are less preferable than ones in which Sofia brought apple pie).  
 
(32) a.   EXScale:Speaker-Preferences [if only she had brought an apple pie]! 
 b. Core meaning (due to EX): [p she brought an apple pie] exceeds the   
  threshold ξ on a scale that reflects the speaker’s preferences in the   
  utterance context. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
13 Available online at:  http://www.zeno.org/nid/20005630711 (Zenodot Verlagsgesellschaft mbH) 
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I assume that both if- and that-clauses can be complements to EX. As argued in 
Grosz 2011b, this allows us to uniformly account for optatives with the form of if-
clauses, such as the above, and optatives with the form of that-clauses, (33a), as 
well as polar exclamatives (utterances that express surprise at a fact), (33b). All of 
these exclamative utterances contain the operator EX. Polar exclamatives differ 
from optatives in that they combine not with a preference scale, but with a scale 
that models surprisingness or shockingness (possibly a speaker-oriented 
subjective unlikelihood scale). 
 
(33) a.   Oh, that I had told them both a year ago! 
  (Martin F. Tupper. 1851. The Twins; A Domestic Novel.)14 
 b. That you could ever want to marry such a man! 
  (Quirk et al. 1985: 841) 
 
It follows that optativity does not compositionally arise from the presence of the 
particles that we find in optatives. My approach sides with scholars such as 
Rosengren (1993), who assume that particles are prototypical rather than 
obligatory for optatives (i.e. optatives do not require particles, but they are most 
natural if they do contain particles), against scholars who argue that particles are 
obligatory in optatives (e.g. Pittner 2007). 
How does the quasi-obligatoriness of particles in optatives arise? I argue that 
it is due to a semantic conspiracy. As discussed above, EX contributes generalized 
exclamativity, one shade of which is optativity, while particles (such as AT LEAST) 
contribute non-truth-conditional meaning (such as a settling-for-less attitude in 
the case of AT LEAST). I now explore their interaction. First of all, utterances with 
the shape of an optative typically have various readings, some of which are more 
marked than others. If we assume that EX can freely combine with if-clauses, then 
(34a) has an optative reading, given in (34c). However, according to native 
speakers’ intuitions, (34a) can only be understood as an incomplete, fragmentary 
conditional, and not as an optative; so (34c) must be somehow blocked. As Scholz 
(1991) observes, based on extensive corpus research, optatives are relatively rare, 
from which we may infer that the non-optative reading in (34b) is more readily 
accessible. This alone will, however, not suffice to block the optative reading in 
(34c). In fact, based on what we know about ambiguity resolution, one may 
expect the fragmentary nature (and thus ill-formedness) of (34b) to be sufficient 
to make the well-formed reading in (34c) accessible. So why would native 
speakers nevertheless judge (34a) to be ill-formed, and the (34c) reading to be 
unavailable? In what follows, I argue that the blocking of the reading in (34c) is 
due to extra-grammatical principles that govern successful communication. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
14 Available online at:  http://www.gutenberg.org/files/16574/16574-h/16574-h.htm 
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(34) a.   # Wenn sie  einen Apfelkuchen gebracht  hätte! 
  if   she   a    apple.cake   brought had 
  ‘If she had brought an apple pie!’ 
 b. unmarked reading:    # conditional antecedent (fragmentary) 
 c. marked reading:     ü optative utterance (complete, but blocked) 
 
First, I propose that particles bias marked readings, due to implicatures that they 
trigger or due to incompatibility with unmarked readings. In the case of 
wenigstens ‘at least’, this is plausibly due to the fact that the particle  conveys the 
desirability of the modified proposition (cf. (17) and the discussion thereof). 
The core idea is that an element like wenigstens ‘at least’ can reverse 
interpretive preferences, as in (35), which contrasts with (34). In this sense, 
wenigstens ‘at least’ serves as a cue (or bias) for an optative reading; for now, I 
define (semantic) cue as an element that makes a less salient reading more salient. 
 
(35) a.    Wenn sie  wenigstens einen  Apfelkuchen  gebracht  hätte! 
  if   she   at.least    a    apple.cake   brought had 
  ‘If she had brought an apple pie!’ 
 b. dispreferred unmarked reading:    # conditional antecedent 
 c. preferred marked reading:      ü optative utterance 
 
We now need to address the two following questions: First, why does concessive 
AT LEAST act as a cue for optativity? Second, why are optative readings like (34c) 
(provided they exist, which is what I argue for) unavailable in absence of a cue, 
even if the only competing reading (in (34b)) is independently ruled out? 
I propose that AT LEAST cues optativity due to its semantic contribution. 
Consider first the complete conditional in (36a) and the elliptical conditional in  
(36b) (a continuation rise on hätte ‘had’ marks  (36b) as an incomplete utterance). 
In contexts in which the intended consequent can be inferred, (36b) may be 
licensed; what we observe, similar to what we saw in (17), is that (36a-b) cannot 
be uttered without the speaker conveying a positive evaluation of it rained, due to 
the semantics of wenigstens ‘at least’. In this sense, (36a-b) end up conveying 
desirability very much like the desirability conveyed by the optative in (36c) 
(which differs from (36b) in its intonation pattern: Optatives typically have a 
falling intonation). The core contribution of an optative is to convey desirability 
of the modified proposition; as discussed, concessive AT LEAST does so, too, thus 
smoothing out the categorical difference in meaning between a non-optative 
utterance such as (36a-b) and an optative utterance such as (36c). I propose that 
this is sufficient to make an optative reading of an if-clause more salient: while it 
may initially be marked to utter an if-clause with an optative reading, the 
independent marking of desirability can make such an intention evident. 
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(36) a.  Wenn es wenigstens geregnet hätte,  wäre ich zuhause geblieben. 
  if   it  at.least    rained  had  were I  at.home stayed 
  ‘If at least it had rained, I would have stayed at home.’ 
 b.    Ja, wenn es wenigstens geregnet hätte … (elliptical conditional) 
 c.   Wenn es wenigstens geregnet hätte!  (optative) 
 
We have thus seen how concessive AT LEAST can act as a cue for optativity; it 
simply conveys desirability, thus making an expression of desirability (which is 
what optativity is all about) more salient. 
We can now proceed to account for the obligatoriness of cues, i.e. the deviant 
status of (34a) with the intended reading in (34c). If (34c) is technically an 
available reading for (34a), and (34b) is ill-formed anyway, why does (34c) not 
become available? (Or: why is (34c) so hard, if not impossible, to access?) I 
propose to account for this by making standard assumptions on rational discourse 
participants, using Lewis’s (1969) signaling games. I have argued that particles 
like wenigstens ‘at least’ act as cues for an independently available optative 
reading. In terms of Lewis’s (1969: 130-133) signaling games, speakers and 
hearers have to commit to certain communicative strategies in order to allow for 
successful communication. In our examples, this entails that a speaker has to 
decide whether to use an optativity cue (such as AT LEAST), as in (35), or not, as in 
(34); correspondingly, a hearer has to decide how to disambiguate a cue-less, 
ambiguous utterance like (34a) (assuming, for simplicity, that (35a) is 
unambiguously optative). Let us further assume (for simplicity) that there are cues 
for optative readings, but no cues for the more canonical non-optative readings. If 
we now assume that cues are minimally costly (i.e. the utility of successful 
communication with a cue is slightly lower than the utility of successful 
communication without a cue), we can derive that cues will always be used when 
the context does not independently provide a strong bias for an optative 
interpretation. This can be illustrated as in (37) below. Assume that the speaker 
(s) has to decide whether to utter an optative with a cue (CUE), e.g. (35a) to mean 
(35c), or without a cue (¬CUE), e.g. (34a) to mean (34c). Assume further that the 
hearer (h) has to decide whether to interpret a cue-less, ambiguous utterance as an 
optative (OPT), as in (34c), or as a non-optative conditional fragment (¬OPT), as in 
(34b). Finally, assume that misunderstanding has a utility of 0 for both discourse 
participants, understanding without effort (i.e. without cues) has a utility of 2 and 
understanding with effort (i.e. with cues) has a utility of 1. (These numbers are 
arbitrary and merely reflect a preference order between the three scenarios.15) We 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
15 In fact, the penalty for using cues is probably much lower, so it may be more realistic to assume 
a utility of 1.9 for understanding with effort (i.e. with cues). Determining the exact utilities would 
require experimental evidence, which is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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then calculate the expected utilities (EU) of a set of strategies (such as (37a)) as 
the sum of the respective probability that a speaker intends to utter an optative 
(abbreviated as ρ) and a non-optative conditional fragment (1–ρ), multiplied by 
the corresponding payoffs. For instance, if the speaker commits to the strategy of 
not using cues for optativity (s → ¬CUE) and the hearer commits to the strategy of 
disambiguating a cue-less if-clause towards a non-optative conditional antecedent 
(h → ¬OPT), the expected utility of this set of strategies would be as in (37a),16 
calculated as follows: in a situation, in which the speaker intends to utter an 
optative (sopt with prior probability ρ), misunderstanding will arise, as the hearer 
will interpret the cue-less optative as non-optative (i.e. the first summand in 
calculating the expected utility in (37a) will be 0ρ). In a situation in which the 
speaker intends to utter a non-optative conditional antecedent (s¬opt with prior 
probability 1-ρ), effortless (i.e. cue-less) understanding will arise (i.e. the second 
summand in calculating the expected utility in (37a) will be 2(1-ρ)). Adding the 
two values yields the expected utility of 2–2ρ, as given. The reader may now wish 
to verify the other expected utilities in (37b-d), which are calculated accordingly. 
 
(37)  h → ¬OPT h → OPT 
 s → ¬CUE a. EU = 2–2ρ c. EU = 2ρ 
 s → CUE b. EU = 2–ρ d. EU = ρ 
 
Let us now assume, with Lewis (1969), that the most successful set of strategies is 
the one with the highest expected utilities. What becomes obvious is that the most 
successful set of strategies will always be (37b) if the context does not 
independently bias an optative reading (e.g. if ρ = 0.5). Only if the prior 
probability of an optative reading is sufficiently high (in our illustration with the 
simplistic utilities 1, 2 and 3, this is the case if ρ > 0.66), the strategies change and 
(37c) becomes the most efficient set of strategies. This derives the quasi-
obligatoriness of particles in optatives. It also predicts that we should find 
particle-free optatives in contexts that strongly bias an optative reading over 
alternative readings (in which case, the preferred strategies should be (37c)). (38) 
presents examples from German that are consistent with such a prediction. 
 
(38) a.    Wenn ich deine  Statur hätte! 
  if   I  your  build  had 
  ‘If [only] I had your build!’         (adapted from Evans 2007) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
16 I assume that the expected utilities of the speaker are identical to those of the hearer; 
correspondingly, I only write each expected utility once; 2–2ρ can be seen as an abbreviation for 
(2-2ρ, 2-2ρ), where the left term represents the speaker’s EU and the right term the hearer’s EU. 
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 b. Rico looked at the flowers and thought: 
         Wenn Stineli  diese  sehen könnte! 
  if   Stineli  these  see   could 
  ‘If [only] Stineli could see these!’  
  and stood at the fence for a long time without moving. 
  (Johanna Spyri. 1878. Heimatlos. First discussed in Grosz 2011a) 
 c. WÄRE  ich  zuhause  geblieben! 
  WERE  I   at.home  stayed 
  ‘HAD I [only] stayed home!’       (Rosengren 1993:36) 
 d. Dass ich  noch  einmal  Venedig  sehen könnte! 
  that  I   still  once   Venice   see    could 
  ‘Oh that I could see Venice once more!’  (Truckenbrodt 2006) 
 
Further evidence for the independence of optativity from the semantics of 
prototypical particles stems from the paradigm in (39). As indicated, there is no 
single particle that is obligatory in an optative, i.e. either of them can license it, 
(39b-d); moreover, particles can combine quite freely, (39e-h). Another relevant 
observation (due to Scholz 1991) is that interjections, such as ach ‘oh’ can also 
license optatives, (39i). Only the construction without any such elements is ill-
formed, (39j), corroborating the cue-like (non-obligatory) nature of such 
elements. This is reflected by the choice in (37) of referring to a generalized CUE 
element (which can be any of these particles) rather than a specific particle. 
 
(39) a. Ach, wenn  er doch nur wenigstens rechtzeitig gekommen wäre!  
  oh  if   he doch only at.least   in.time   come    were 
  ‘Oh, if only he had at least come in time!’ 
 b.    Wenn er doch           rechtzeitig gekommen wäre!  
 c.    Wenn er    nur        rechtzeitig gekommen wäre!  
 d.    Wenn er       wenigstens rechtzeitig gekommen wäre! 
 e.    Wenn er doch nur        rechtzeitig gekommen wäre!  
 f.    Wenn er doch    wenigstens rechtzeitig gekommen wäre!  
 g.    Wenn er    nur wenigstens rechtzeitig gekommen wäre!  
 h.    Wenn er doch nur wenigstens rechtzeitig gekommen wäre!  
 i. Ach, wenn   er              rechtzeitig gekommen wäre!  
 j.   #    Wenn er              rechtzeitig gekommen wäre!  
6 Summary and Conclusion 
To summarize, I have argued that the prototypical particles that we find in 
optatives have a semantic contribution independent from optativity. Specifically, I 
have argued, based on cross-linguistic observations, that AT LEAST corresponds to 
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what Nakanishi & Rullmann (2009) call concessive AT LEAST whenever it serves 
to ‘license’ optativity. To account for the quasi-obligatoriness of particles, I have 
argued that their licensing function arises from independent communicative 
principles in the spirit of Lewis 1969: they make an optative reading of an 
ambiguous utterance salient in a context in which it is not independently biased, 
and as a consequence, speakers will always use them in such contexts. 
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